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ABSTRACT
Predicting the outcomes of integrating Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) into
the National Aerospace (NAS) is a complex problem which is required to be
addressed by simulation studies before allowing the routine access of UAS
into the NAS. This thesis focuses on providing 2D and 3D simulation frame-
works using a game theoretical methodology to evaluate integration concepts
in scenarios where manned and unmanned air vehicles co-exist. The funda-
mental gap in the literature is that the models of interaction between manned
and unmanned vehicles are insufficient: a) they assume that pilot behavior
is known a priori and b) they disregard decision making processes. The con-
tribution of this work is to propose a modeling framework, in which, human
pilot reactions are modeled using reinforcement learning and a game theo-
retical concept called level-k reasoning to fill this gap. The level-k reasoning
concept is based on the assumption that humans have various levels of deci-
sion making. Reinforcement learning is a mathematical learning method that
is rooted in human learning. In this work, a classical and an approximate re-
inforcement learning (Neural Fitted Q Iteration) methods are used to model
time-extended decisions of pilots with 2D and 3D maneuvers. An analysis
of UAS integration is conducted using example scenarios in the presence of
manned aircraft and fully autonomous UAS equipped with sense and avoid
algorithms.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Objective and Motivation
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) refer to aircraft without an on-board hu-
man pilot. Instead, UAS can be controlled with an off-board operator or
can be programmed to fly autonomously. UAS have operational and cost
advantages over manned aircraft in many areas such as surveillance, com-
mercial, scientific and agricultural, and the interest in UAS is increasing
rapidly. However, UAS still do not have routine access to National Airspace
System (NAS) [1]. Since technologies, standards and procedures for a safe
integration of UAS into airspace haven’t matured yet, UAS can fly only
in segregated airspace with restricting rules in most of the countries. For
instance, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in USA have regulations
which prevents routine UAS operations in the NAS. Aviation industry is very
sensitive to risk and for new vehicles such as UAS to enter into this sector,
they need to be proven to be safe and it must be shown that they will not
affect the existing airspace system in any negative way [2,3]. Technical issues
such as communication between the UAS and air traffic control as well as
a trustworthy Sense and Avoid (SAA) system are among the primary im-
pediments that prevent the integration of the UAS into the NAS [1]. Sense
and avoid capability refers to the ability of UAS to sense, detect and exe-
cute maneuvers to resolve a conflict with other aircraft and obstacles in the
surrounding traffic. Until technologies, standards, requirements and proce-
dures for a safe integration of UAS into airspace are matured, there will not
be enough data accumulated about the technical issues and it will be hard
to predict the effects of the technologies and concepts that are developed for
the integration. Although research efforts exist to develop a safe and efficient
real test environment for UAS integration [4], experimental tests are expen-
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sive and experimental failures can cause severe economic loss. Therefore,
employing simulations is currently the only way to understand the effects of
UAS integration on the air traffic system [5]. These simulation studies need
to be conducted with hybrid airspace system (HAS) models, where manned
and unmanned vehicles coexist.
Before an SAA system is approved, its potential impact on the safety of
the surrounding air traffic should be analyzed. To perform an analysis and
evaluation of any SAA logic, it is necessary to model the actions that a pilot
would take during a conflict [6]. HAS models in the literature are generally
based on the assumption that the pilots of manned aircraft always behave as
they should, without deviating from the ideal behavior. In their work, [6],
Maki et al. constructed an SAA logic based on the model developed by the
MIT Lincoln Laboratory [7] and Kuchar et al. [8] did a rigorous analysis
of the traffic control alert system (TCAS) to implement an SAA algorithm
for remotely piloted vehicles. TCAS is an on-board collision avoidance sys-
tem which observes and tracks surrounding air traffic, detects conflicts and
suggests avoidance maneuvers to the pilots. In both of these studies, SAA
system are evaluated through simulations in a platform which uses MIT’s
NAS encounter model. In the evaluations, it is assumed that pilot decisions
are known a priori and depend on the relative motion of the adversary dur-
ing a specific conflict scenario. In their work, Perez-Batlle et al. [9] classified
separation conflicts between manned and unmanned aircraft and proposed
separation maneuvers for each class. These maneuvers are tested in a sim-
ulation environment, where it is assumed that the pilots will follow these
maneuvers 100% of the time. Florent et al. [10] developed a SAA algorithm
and tested it via simulations and experiments. In both of these tests, it is
assumed that the intruding aircraft does not change its path while the UAS
is implementing the SAA algorithm. There are other simulation studies such
as [11] that test and evaluate different collision avoidance algorithms, where
some predefined actions are used as pilot models. There are also substan-
tial studies with remotely piloted aircraft where the effects of SAA systems
on the workload and situational awareness of the pilots are investigated via
simulations and flight tests [12], [13]. These HAS models are designed to
evaluate and test the performance of collision avoidance systems in single
encounter scenarios in which the intruder (generally a manned aircraft) has
a pre-defined behavior with no consideration of the decision making process
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of the pilot. These models are valuable and essential at the initial stages of
evaluating a new method but it is not realistic to expect that the pilot, as
a decision maker (DM), will always behave deterministically and in a pre-
defined manner. It is not always predictable, for example, how pilots will
respond to the TCAS [14]. The collision between two aircraft (a DHL Boe-
ing 757 and a Bashkirian Tupolev 154) over Uberlingen, Germany, near the
Swiss border On 21:35 (UTC) July 1, 2002, is a good evidence that pilots may
decide not to act parallel to TCAS advisory or may ignore traffic controller’s
commands, during high-stress situations [14]. In addition, in recent stud-
ies, it was shown that only 13% of pilot responses match the deterministic
pilot model that was assumed for TCAS development [15], [16]. Therefore,
incorporating human decision-making processes in HAS models has a strong
potential to improve the predictive power of these models.
1.2 Approach
In this thesis, a 2D and a 3D game theoretical Hybrid Airspace System (HAS)
modeling framework are built, where pilot reactions are obtained through
a decision making process. Below, 2D and 3D frameworks are explained
separately.
2D framework: In the 2D HAS model, the pilot behavior is not assumed
to be known a priory and decisions are obtained utilizing a) the bounded ra-
tionality concept, which helps model imperfect decisions, as opposed to mod-
eling the pilot as a perfect decision maker, b) reinforcement learning, which
helps model time-extended decisions, as opposed to assuming one-shot deci-
sion making. In order to predict pilot reactions in complex scenarios where
UAS and manned aircraft co-exist, in the presence of automation such as
an SAA system, a game theoretical methodology is employed, which is for-
mally known as semi network-form games (SNFGs) [15]. Using this method,
probable outcomes of HAS scenarios are obtained that contains interacting
humans (pilots) who also interact with UAS equipped with an SAA algo-
rithm. In these scenarios, close encounters are simulated where TCAS and
air traffic management instructions can also be incorporated. To obtain re-
alistic pilot reactions, bounded rationality is imposed by utilizing the level-k
approach [17, 18], a concept in game theory which models human behavior
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assuming that humans think in different levels of reasoning. In the proposed
framework, pilots optimize their trajectories based on a goal function repre-
senting their preferences for system states. During the simulations, UAS fly
autonomously based on a pre-programmed flight plan. In these simulations,
the effect of certain system variables, such as horizontal separation require-
ment and required time to conflict for UAS and the effect of responsibility
assignment for conflict resolutions on the safety and performance of the HAS
are analyzed (see [4] for the importance of these variables and responsibility
assignment for UAS integration.). To enable UAS to perform autonomously
in the simulations, it is assumed that they employ an SAA algorithm. The
simulation results are provided for 2 different SAA methods and, in addi-
tion, these 2 methods are compared quantitatively in terms of safety and
performance, using the proposed modeling framework.
In prior works, the method exploited in this paper was used to investigate
small scale scenarios (in terms of number of agents): In [19], the dynamics
between a smart grid operator and a cyber attacker, and in [15, 20, 21], the
dynamics between two interacting pilots are modeled. More recently, in [22],
a medium scale scenario with 50 interacting pilots is analyzed. In the study
with 50 pilots, the simulation environment utilized a gridded airspace where
aircraft moved from a grid intersection to another to represent movement. In
addition, the pilots could only observe grid intersections to see whether or not
another aircraft was nearby. All these simplifying assumptions decreased the
computational cost but also decreased the fidelity of the simulation. In this
thesis, a) a dramatically more complex scenario in the presence of manned
and unmanned aircraft is investigated, b) the simulation environment is not
discretized and the aircraft movements are simulated in continuous time, c)
realistic aircraft and UAS physical models are used and d) initial states of the
aircraft are obtained from real flight data. Hence, a much more representative
simulation environment with the inclusion of UAS equipped with a SAA
algorithm is used to obtain probabilistic outcomes of HAS scenarios.
3D framework: The 2D game theoretical approach has two limitations:
First, HAS models are developed for a 2D airspace. Second, the policies,
i.e. maps from observation spaces to action spaces, obtained for the decision
makers remain unchanged during their interaction. To remove these limi-
tations the 2D framework is extended and a 3D HAS model is introduced
where the strategic decision makers can modify their policies during inter-
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actions between each other. Therefore, compared to the 2D HAS model a
much larger class of interactions are modeled.
It is shown in the literature that 1) in repeated strategic interactions, where
agents consider other agents’ possible actions before determining their own,
agents with different cognitive abilities change their behavior during the in-
teraction [23]; and 2) there is a positive relationship between cognitive ability
and reasoning levels [24] and [23]. These observations lead to agents with
different levels of reasoning who can observe their opponents behavior dur-
ing repeated interactions, update their beliefs on their opponents reasoning
level and change their own level-k rule against them. In their works in [24]
and [23], authors introduce a systematic level-k structure where players can
update their beliefs about their opponents, and switch their own level rule up
one level during their interactions. There are also other level-k rule learning
models in the literature such as the one presented in [25] and [26]. Based
on the rule learning methods introduced in these works the agent levels can
reach up to infinity. This is not a problem for the applications investigated
in these studies since they are executed on games in the field of economics in
which obtaining level-k rules (k=0,1,2,...,infinity) are straight forward due to
the number of agents in the games. Since 1) it is computationally expensive
to obtain higher levels, and 2) in certain experimental studies it is shown
that humans in general have a maximum reasoning level of 2 [17], the ex-
isting level-k rule learning methods may not be suitable for the application
considered in this work where more than 180 decision makers are modeled
simultaneously in a time extended manner. In this study, we propose a sim-
pler method for modeling level rule update during interactions by a) limiting
the levels up to 2 and b) allowing rule update only if a trajectory conflict is
detected.
Different from the 2D HAS model developed in [27], [28], in this study, the
game theoretical modeling framework is developed for a 3D HAS model which
allows to cover a much larger class of integration scenarios. The reinforcement
learning algorithm used in the authors’ earlier works [27], [28] employs a
table to store the Q values of all state (location of the intruder in a girded
observation space, approach angle of the intruder, best trajectory action,
best destination action and previous action)-action (turn left, turn right, go
straight) pairs, which define how preferable to take a certain action given the
observations/states. This poses a challenge for the application of the method
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to systems with a large numbers of state-action pairs such as the proposed
3D HAS model in this study. To circumvent this issue, Neural Fitted Q
Iteration (NFQ) method [29], [30] and [31], an approximate reinforcement
learning algorithm is utilized. Approximate reinforcement learning methods
use function approximators to represent the Q value function [32]. In other
words, instead of saving Q values for each state-action pair, Q value function
is approximated by a function approximator. In the case of NFQ, a neural
network is used as the function approximator. NFQ approach also allowed
using a continuous observation space, which also contributed to obtain a
more precise definition of the agents observations, compared to [our earlier
papers], where a discretized observation space was used.
In the simulations, pilot models, that are obtained using the proposed
game theoretical modeling framework, are used in complex scenarios, where
UAS and manned aircraft co-exist, to analyze the probable outcomes of HAS
scenarios. The HAS scenarios contain interacting humans (pilots) who also
interact with multiple UAS with their own sense and avoid (SAA) systems.
It is noted that automation other than SAA systems, such as TCAS, and pos-
sible air traffic management instructions can also be incorporated into the
proposed framework. During the simulations, UAS fly autonomously based
on a pre-programmed flight plan. In these simulations, the effect of respon-
sibility assignment for conflict resolutions on the safety and performance of
the HAS are analyzed.
1.3 Organization
The organization of the thesis in the following chapters is is described as
below: Chapter II is devoted to the 2D game theoretical framework. The
modeling methodology as well as details of the scenario consisting of multiple
manned aircraft and a UAS is described completely. The obtained 2D HAS
model is validated and the results of simulation for the UAS integration is
shown at the end of chapter. In Chapter III, the 3D game theoretical pilot
model and the modifications that are done upon the 2D HAS model are ex-
plained in detail. The rest of chapter is devoted to the results of simulation in
single encounter scenarios and UAS integrated scenario. Finally, concluding
remarks are provided in Chapter IV.
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CHAPTER 2
2D FRAMEWORK
2.1 Modeling Methodology
The most challenging problem in the prediction of the outcomes of complex
scenarios where manned and unmanned aircraft co-exist is obtaining realistic
pilot models. A pilot model in this paper refers to a mapping from observa-
tions of the pilot to his/her actions. To achieve a realistic human reaction
model, certain requirements need to be met. First, the model should not be
deterministic since it is known from everyday experience that humans do not
always react exactly the same when they are in a given “state”. Here, “state”
refers to the observations and the memory of the pilot. For instance, observ-
ing that an aircraft is approaching from a certain distance is an observation
and remembering one’s own previous action is memory. Second, pilots should
show the characteristics of a strategic Decision Maker (DM) meaning that
the decisions must be influenced by the expected moves of other “agents”.
Agents can be either the other pilots or the automation logic of UAS. Third,
the decisions emanating from the model should not always be the best (or
mathematically optimal) decisions since it is known that human actions are
less than optimal in many situations. Finally, it should be considered that
a human DM’s predictions about other human DMs are not always correct.
To accomplish all of these requirements, level-k reasoning and reinforcement
learning are used together, forming a non-equilibrium game theoretical solu-
tion concept. It is noted that in this study, the UAS are assumed to be fully
autonomous.
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2.1.1 Game Theoretical Modeling of Interactive Decision
Making
Level-k reasoning is a game theoretical solution concept whose main idea is
that humans have various levels of reasoning in their decision making process.
Level-0 represents a “non-strategic” DM who does not take into account other
DMs’ possible moves when choosing his/her own actions. This behavior can
also be named as reflexive since it only reacts to the immediate observations.
In this study, given a state, a level-0 pilot flies an aircraft with constant
speed and heading starting from its initial position toward its destination.
A level-1 DM assumes that the other agents in the scenario are level-0 and
takes actions accordingly to maximize his/her rewards. A level-2 DM takes
actions as though the other DMs are level-1. In a hierarchical manner, a
level-k DM takes actions assuming that the other DMs behave as level-(k-1)
DMs.
2.1.2 Reinforcement Learning for the Partially Observable
Markov Decision Process
Reinforcement learning is a mathematical learning mechanism which mimics
the human learning process. An agent receives an observable message of an
environment’s state, then chooses an action, which changes the environment’s
state, and the environment in return encourages or punishes the agent with
a scalar reinforcement signal known as reward. Given a state, when an
action increases (decreases) the value of an objective function (reward), which
defines the goals of the agent, the probability of taking that action increases
(decreases). Reinforcement learning algorithms mostly involve estimating
two value functions: State value function V and state-action value function
Q [33]. V (s), the value of the state “s”, is the total amount of reward an
agent can expect to gather in the future, starting from that state. It is an
estimate of how good it is for an agent to be in a particular state. Q(s, a),
the value of taking the action “a” in the state “s”, under a particular policy,
is the total amount of reward an agent can expect to gather in the future
starting from that state and taking that action by following the given policy.
It is an estimate of how good it is for an agent to perform a given action in
a given state.
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Since the human DM as the agent in the reinforcement learning process
is not able to observe the whole environment state (i.e. the positions of all
of the aircraft in the scenario), the agent receives only partial state infor-
mation. By assuming that the environment is Markov, and based on the
partial observability of the state information, this problem can be general-
ized to a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP). In this
study, the reinforcement learning algorithm developed by Jaakkola et al. [34]
is used to solve this POMDP. In this approach, different from conventional
reinforcement learning algorithms, the agent does not need to observe all of
the states, for the algorithm to converge. A POMDP value function and a
Q-value function, in which m and a refer to the observable message of the
state, s, and action, respectively, are given by:
V (m) =
∑
s∈m
P (s|m)V (s) (2.1)
Q(m, a) =
∑
s∈m
P (s|m)Q(s, a). (2.2)
A recursive Monte-Carlo strategy is used to compute the value function and
the Q-value function. It is noted that the pilot model is given in terms
of a policy, pi, which is a mapping from observations or messages, m, to
actions, a. During reinforcement learning, the policy update is calculated as
below, where the policy is updated toward pi1 with ε learning rate, after each
iteration:
pi(a|m)→ (1− ε)pi(a|m) + εpi1(a|m) (2.3)
where, pi1 is chosen such that, Jpi
1
= max
a
(Qpi(m, a)−V pi(m)). For any policy
pi1(a|m), Jpi1 is defined as:
Jpi
1
=
∑
a
pi1(a|m)(Qpi(m, a)− V pi(m)). (2.4)
It is noted that the pilot model, or the policy, is obtained once the policy
converges during this iterative process.
2.1.3 Combining Game Theory With Reinforcement Learning
The method employed in this study carefully combines the two concepts ex-
plained in the above sections: game theory (GT) and reinforcement learning
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(RL). The method consists of two stages: 1) obtaining pilot reaction models
with various levels (level-k) and 2) simulating a given scenario using these
models. In the first stage, which can also be considered as the “training”
stage, a level-1 type model is trained by assigning level-0 behavior to all of
the agents but the one that is being trained. The trainee learns to react as
best as he/she can in this environment using RL. Thus, the resulting behavior
becomes a level-1 type. Similarly, a level-2 behavior is trained by assigning
level-1 behavior to all of the agents but the trainee. This process continues
until the highest desired level is reached. Once all of the desired levels are
obtained, the first stage ends and in the second stage a given scenario is sim-
ulated by assigning certain proportions of these levels to the agents in the
scenario. It is noted that in the scenario investigated in this paper, the pilots
of the manned aircraft have level-0, level-1 and level-2 behavior types whereas
the movements of the UAS are commanded via sense and avoid algorithms.
2.2 Components of the Hybrid Airspace Scenario
The investigated scenario consists of 180 manned aircraft with predefined
desired trajectories and an UAS which moves based on its pre-programmed
flight plan from one waypoint to another. Fig. 2.1 shows a snapshot of
this scenario where the red squares correspond to manned aircraft and the
cyan square corresponds to the UAS. The size of the considered airspace is
600km × 300km. The airspace is gridded just to make it easier to visually
grasp the dimensions (two neighboring grid points are 5nm away), neverthe-
less all aircraft, manned or unmanned, move in the airspace continuously.
Yellow circles show the predetermined waypoints that the UAS is required to
pass. The blue lines passing through the waypoints show the predetermined
path of the UAS. It is noted that the UAS does not follow this path exactly
since it needs to deviate from its original trajectory to avoid possible conflicts
using an on-board SAA algorithm. The initial positions, speeds and headings
of the aircraft are obtained from Flightradar24 website which provides live air
traffic data (http://www.flightradar24.com). The data is collected from
air traffic volume on Colorado state, USA airspace on 11 March, 2015. It
is noted that in the Next Generation Airspace System (NextGen) air travel
demand is expected to increase dramatically, thus traffic density is expected
10
UAS
Figure 2.1: Snapshot of the hybrid airspace scenario in the simulation
platform. Each square stands for a 5nm× 5nm area.
to be much more than it is today. To represent this situation, the number of
aircraft in the scenario is increased by projecting various aircraft at differ-
ent altitudes to a given altitude. To handle the increase in aircraft volume
in NextGen, it is expected that new technologies and automation will be
introduced such as the automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-
B), which is a technology that enables an aircraft to receive other aircraft’s
identification, position and velocity information and to send its information
to others. In the investigated scenario, it is assumed that each aircraft is
equipped with the ADS-B. It is noted that the ADS-B can also provide in-
formation about the flight path of an aircraft, which is highly relevant to
collision avoidance. In our simulations, we provided this crucial information
by answering the question “in a given time window, where in my observation
space do I expect an intruding aircraft?”, for each agent (see Section 2.2.1
for details).
2.2.1 Pilot Observations and Memory
Although ADS-B provides the positions and the velocities of other aircraft,
with his/her limited cognitive capabilities a pilot can not possibly process
all this information during his/her decision making process. In this study,
in order to model pilot limitations, including the limitations at visual acuity
and perception depth, as well as the limited viewing range of an aircraft,
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it is assumed that the pilots can observe (or process) the information from
a limited portion of the nearby airspace. This limited portion is simulated
as equal angular portions of two co-centered circles called the “observation
space” which is schematically depicted in Fig. 2.2. The radius of the inner
circle represents pilot vision range, which is taken as 1nm based on a survey
executed in [35]. The radius of the outer circle is a variable that depends on
the separation requirements. Since standard separation for manned aviation
is 3 − 5nm [9], this radius is taken as 5nm. Whenever an intruder aircraft
moves toward one of the 6 regions of the observation space (see Fig. 2.2),
the pilot perceives that region as “full”. The pilot, in addition, can roughly
distinguish the approach angle of the approaching intruder. A “full” region
is categorized into four cases; with a) 0◦ < approach angle < 90◦, b) 90◦ <
approach angle < 180◦, c) 180◦ < approach angle < 270◦ and d) 270◦ <
approach angle < 360◦. Fig. 2.2 depicts a typical example, where pilot A
observes that aircraft B is moving toward one of the 6 regions that is colored.
In this particular example, pilot A perceives the colored region as “full”
with approach angle in the interval [90◦, 180◦] and the rest of the regions as
“empty”. The information about emptiness, fullness of a region and approach
angle is fed to the reinforcement learning algorithm simply by assigning 0 to
empty regions and 1, 2, 3, 4 to full regions, based on the approach angle
classifications explained above. Pilots also know the best action that would
move the aircraft closest to its trajectory (BTA: Best Trajectory Action) and
the best action that would move the aircraft closest to its final destination
(BDA: Best Destination Action). Moreover, pilots have a memory of what
their actions were at the previous time step. Given an observation, the pilots
can choose between three actions: 45◦ left, straight, or 45◦ right, which
are coded with numbers 0, 1 and 2. Six ADS-B observations, one BTA, one
BDA, and one previous move make up nine total inputs for the reinforcement
learning algorithm. Observations get 5 values, 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4. The previous
move, BTA and BDA have three dimensions each: 45◦ left, 45◦ right, or
straight. Therefore, the number of states for which the reinforcement learning
algorithm needs to assign appropriate actions is 56 × 33 = 421, 875.
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Figure 2.2: Pilot observation space.
2.2.2 Pilot Objective Function
The goal of the reinforcement learning algorithm is to find the optimum
probability distribution among possible action choices for each state. As ex-
plained above, reinforcement learning achieves this goal by evaluating actions
based on their return which is calculated via a reward/objective function. A
reward function can be considered as a happiness function, goal function or
utility function which represents, mathematically, the preferences of the pilot
among different states. In this paper, the pilot reward function is defined as
reward = w1∗(−C)+w2∗(−S)+w3∗(−CA)+w4∗(D)+w5∗(−P )+w6∗(−E).
(2.5)
In (2.5), “C” is the number of aircraft within the collision region. Based on
the definition provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the
radius of collision is taken as 500ft [36]. “S” is the number of air vehicles
within the separation region. The radius of the separation region is 5nm [9].
“CA” represents whether the aircraft is getting closer to the intruder or going
away from the intruder and takes values 1, for getting closer, or 0, for going
away. “D” represents how much the aircraft gets closer to or goes away
from its destination normalized by the maximum distance it can fly in a time
step. The time step is determined based on the frequency of pilot decisions.
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The average time step during reinforcement learning is determined to be 20
seconds. “P” represents how much the aircraft gets closer to or goes away
from its ideal trajectory normalized by the maximum distance it can fly in
a time step and “E” represents whether or not the pilot makes an effort
(move). “E” gets a value of 1 if the pilot makes a new move and 0 otherwise.
2.2.3 Manned Aircraft Model
The initial positions, speeds and heading angles of the manned aircraft are
obtained from Flightradar24 website (http://www.flightradar24.com). It is
assumed that all aircraft are in their en-route phase of travel with constant
speed, ‖~v‖, in the range of [150− 550]knots. Aircraft are controlled by their
pilots who may decide to change the heading angle for 45◦, −45◦ or may
decide to keep it unchanged. Once the pilot gives a heading command, the
aircraft moves to the desired heading, ψd, in the constant speed mode. The
heading change is modeled by a first order dynamics with the standard rate
turn: a turn in which an aircraft changes its heading at a rate of 3◦ per
second (360◦ in 2 minutes) [37]. This is modeled as a first order dynamics
with a time constant of 10s (45× (1− 1/e)/3 ≈ 10). Therefore, the aircraft
heading dynamics can be given as
ψ˙ = − 1
10
× (ψ − ψd) (2.6)
and the velocity, ~v = (vx, vy), is then obtained as:
vx = ‖~v‖ sinψ (2.7)
vy = ‖~v‖ cosψ. (2.8)
2.2.4 UAS Model
The UAS is assumed to have the dynamics of a RQ-4 Global Hawk with
operation speed of 340knots [38]. It moves according to its pre-programmed
flight plan and is also equipped with a SAA system. The SAA system can
initiate a maneuver to keep the UAS away from other traffic, if necessary,
by commanding a velocity vector change. Otherwise, the UAS will continue
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moving based on its mission plan. Therefore, the UAS always receives a
velocity command either to satisfy its mission plan or to protect its safety.
Since the UAS has a finite settling time for velocity vector changes, the de-
sired velocity, ~Vd cannot be reached instantaneously. Therefore, the velocity
vector variation dynamics of the UAS is modeled by a first order dynamics
with a time constant of 1s [39] which is represented as:
~˙v = −(~v − ~vd). (2.9)
2.2.5 Sense And Avoid Algorithms
In order to assure that the UAS can detect probable conflicts and can au-
tonomously perform evasive maneuvers, it should be equipped with a SAA
system. In this paper, two different SAA algorithms are investigated. These
SAA algorithms are developed by Fasano et al. [40] referred as SAA1 and
Mujumdar et al. [39] referred as SAA2. The algorithms consist of two phases;
conflict detection phase and conflict resolution phase. In the detection phase,
the SAA algorithms project the trajectories of the UAS and the intruder air-
craft in time, using a predefined time interval, and if the minimum distance
between the aircraft during this time is calculated to be less than a mini-
mum required distance, R, it is determined that there will be a conflict. The
same conflict detection logic is used for both of the two SAA algorithms.
In order to prevent the conflict, the UAS starts an evasive maneuver in the
conflict resolution phase, which is handled differently for SAA1 and SAA2.
In SAA1 resolution phase algorithm, a velocity adjustment is suggested that
guarantees minimum deviation from the trajectory. The velocity adjustment
command, ~vdA, for the UAS is given in the equation below
~vdA =
[
vAB cos(η − ζ)
sin(ζ)
[sin(η)
~vAB
vAB
− sin(η − ζ) ~r‖~r‖ ]
]
+ ~vB (2.10)
where, ~vA and ~vB refer to the velocity vectors of the UAS and the intruder. ~r
and ~vAB denote the relative position and velocity between the UAS and the
intruder, respectively. ζ is the angle between ~r and ~vAB and η is calculated as
η = sin−1 R‖~r‖ . In the case of multiple conflict detection, the UAS will start an
evasive maneuver to resolve the conflict that is predicted to happen earliest.
In the SAA2 algorithm, the velocity adjustment vector is determined as given
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in the below equation in which ~rm stands for the minimum relative position
vector between the UAS and the intruder during the conflict:
~vdA =
−~vA(~r0.~vAB‖~vAB‖ )− (R− ‖~rm‖) ~rm‖~rm‖
‖ − ~vA(~r0.~vAB‖~vAB‖ )− (R− ‖~rm‖) ~rm‖~rm‖‖
(2.11)
where, ~r0 refers to the initial relative position vector between the UAS and
the intruder. In this solution strategy, UAS moves to resolve the conflict
until it retains the minimum safe distance with the intruder. Similar to the
SAA1 algorithm, in the case of multiple intruders, the UAS will start an
evasive maneuver to resolve the conflict that is predicted to happen earliest.
2.2.6 Model Validation
As noted earlier, since the routine access of UAS into NAS is not a reality
yet and thus there is not enough experience accumulated about the issue,
it is extremely hard to predict the effects of the technologies and concepts
that are developed for the integration. Therefore, employing simulation is
currently the only way to understand the effects of UAS integration on the air
traffic system [5]. However, regardless of whether the modeled system exists
or whether it is expected to be a reality in the future, the representative
model should be validated [41].
Below, we break down the validation task into two steps. In the first step,
we explain that the underlying hierarchical game theoretical modeling ap-
proach is a useful and valid approach to model complex human interactions,
based on earlier experimental studies. In the second step, we investigate the
validity of the proposed approach for the UAS integration implementations.
Since UAS integration data is not available yet, we take a different approach
in this step: We first provide a validation methodology that can be used to
validate the proposed approach when the data for UAS integration becomes
available. We also explain that the proposed model has enough degrees of
freedom that can be used to obtain a predictive model using this data. Then,
we proceed to show that the trajectories created by the proposed model is
similar to that of a validated encounter model for manned aircraft created
using real radar data. Finally, we explain a validation method, called “face
validation”, which is commonly used when the modeled system is expected
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to be a reality in the future, and we argue that our simulation results in the
next section can be used to apply this method.
Validation of the game theoretical modeling approach
In this study, we utilized a well known game theoretical modeling approach
called “level-k” reasoning. The advantage of this approach is its computa-
tional simplicity, where the intelligent agent makes behavioral assumptions
about others and then produces the best response accordingly based on a
reward function. Because of this simplicity, in multi-move scenarios, such
as the ones treated in this research, level-k reasoning provides computation-
ally tractable solutions. This approach not only provides a computationally
efficient solution but also is shown to be able to model complex human in-
teractions in experimental settings: In [17], several experimental results are
conducted using various sizes of subject pools that are made to play differ-
ent games. Using the data from these games, models of strategic thinking
are evaluated and compared and although some perform better than others
depending on the game type, “level-k” approach is found to be “behaviorally
more plausible”. It is noted that these experimental results are cited here not
to prove that the proposed approach is better than other game theoretical
approaches, but to provide real world data showing that the “level- k” mod-
eling approach can represent real world behavior in complex decision making
scenarios. In the scenarios studied in this work, the intelligent agents (pilots)
are also strategic decision makers as explained in earlier sections and they
need to make decisions in a complex environment to maximize their rewards.
Therefore, the underlying game theoretical approach can also be considered
as a good fit to the problem studied in this work.
Validation of the proposed modeling approach for UAS integration concepts
As presented in the previous section, the game theoretical modeling approach
is shown to model real world behavior in earlier experimental studies. In this
section, we address the question “can this approach be reliably used to model
UAS integration scenarios?”.
Validation methodology: There exist several model validation methods
such as “face validity” , “historical data validation”, “parameter sensitivity
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analysis” and “predictive validation” [42]. Among these methods, the most
definitive technique is predictive validation, where the model is used to pre-
dict the system’s behavior and then the outputs of the model and the real
system are compared. Here, we explain two main aspects of predictive val-
idation [7] that can be used to validate the proposed model in this study,
when the UAS integration data becomes available: First, relevant statistics
between the model and the real data should have reasonable agreement. For
example, for UAS integration, the average deviation of the UAS from their
intended trajectory against the type of the SAA algorithm should be similar
between the model and the data. Similarly, the average number of separation
violations between manned and unmanned aircraft for different kinds of SAA
algorithms should match. Secondly, individual encounters should show sim-
ilar characteristics. For example, the minimum separation distance between
UAS and manned aircraft, and pilot decisions during encounters with similar
geometry (approach angle, heading etc.) should be able to be predicted with
reasonable accuracy by the model.
textbfComparison with a validated model: Since UAS integration data is
not available yet, we compared the results of the proposed model with a
manned-aircraft-only encounter model created and validated by the Lincoln
Laboratory using real radar data [7]. Sample trajectories are given in two
text files that are open to the public: cor ac1.txt and cor ac2.txt. Among
the encounters provided, 5 of them (listed as 3rd, 16th, 23rd, 34th and 45th
encounters) do not employ altitude or speed variations for conflict resolution
and thus can be used for our purposes. The objective of these comparisons are
to show that the actions taken by the pilots in the proposed game theoretical
model and the validated model are similar. In addition, minimum separation
distances experienced between the aircraft and the times that the minimum
separation occurs are shown to be reasonably close to each other for the
compared models such that the status of separation violation remains the
same.
Fig. 2.3a demonstrates aircraft trajectories during encounter number 3,
listed in cor ac1.txt. In Fig. 2.3b, the same encounter is regenerated using
the proposed game theoretical model by assigning the same initial positions,
initial heading angles and initial speeds to two aircraft. It is seen that al-
though the trajectories are not exactly the same, pilot decisions determined
by the game theoretical model are similar to the decisions provided by the
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validated model. In addition, according to Fig. 2.3c, the minimum separa-
tion distance is experienced after about 40s and 42s for the validated model
and the game theoretical model, respectively, and the difference between the
minimum distances is about 0.05nm. In this example, the pilots represented
by the solid blue and dashed red curves are modeled as level-1 and level-0
pilots, respectively. Figs. 2.4-2.7 also show similar characteristics where the
encounter trajectories and pilot decisions are similar for the validated and
proposed models.
Face validation: “Face validation” is a validation method used for models
that are developed for systems that are expected to be a reality in the future,
such as UAS integration models [42]. In this method, two aspects of the
model are evaluated: 1) Is the logic in the conceptual model correct? and
2) Are the input-output relationships of the model reasonable? The core
ideas of the proposed framework, such as level-k game theoretical concept,
reinforcement learning and bounded rationality, are supported by several
references earlier in this study. In addition, the logic of the objective function
utilized during the modeling process is detailed where it is seen that the choice
of the terms is logical. Finally, in the simulation results section of this work,
input-output relationships of the model are discussed in length to show that
they represent reasonable system behavior. Therefore, the steps needed for
the face validation of the proposed method are completed.
Remark: It is noted that without collecting, processing and analyzing
real HAS data, which may be available in the near future, and carefully
comparing the outputs with the model, using available statistical validation
tools (see [41]), the validation of the model can not be accepted as completed.
It is important for a model to have enough degrees of freedom so that when
discrepancies with the real data are detected the model can be modified
accordingly to obtain a match with the data with reasonable accuracy [41].
In this regard, the proposed game theoretical framework is a strong candidate
for a successful UAS integration model since it contains several degrees of
freedom such as the objective function weights representing the importance
of each term. In addition, the modular structure of the objective function
allows the designers to add/subtract terms to achieve an agreement with the
data.
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(a) Trajectories created by the validated model.
(b) Trajectories created by the proposed model.
(c) Separation distances for each model.
Figure 2.3: Comparison of the trajectories created by the validated model
and the game theoretical modeling approach for sample encounter number
3.
2.3 Simulation Results and Discussion
In this section, the results of a quantitative analysis of a simulation for UAS
integration scenarios are presented. Before showing the results for the sce-
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(a) Trajectories created by the validated model.
(b) Trajectories created by the proposed model.
(c) Separation distances for each model.
Figure 2.4: Comparison of the trajectories created by the validated model
and the game theoretical modeling approach for sample encounter number
16.
nario explained in the previous section, single encounter scenarios, where a
single UAS and a single manned aircraft are in a collision path, are inves-
tigated. Later, the results for the scenario with multiple encounters in a
crowded airspace are shown. A quantitative comparison between the two
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(a) Trajectories created by the validated model.
(b) Trajectories created by the proposed model.
(c) Separation distances for each model.
Figure 2.5: Comparison of the trajectories created by the validated model
and the game theoretical modeling approach for sample encounter number
23.
SAA algorithms in terms of their performance and safety is also presented.
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(a) Trajectories created by the validated model.
(b) Trajectories created by the proposed model.
(c) Separation distances for each model.
Figure 2.6: Comparison of the trajectories created by the validated model
and the game theoretical modeling approach for sample encounter number
34.
2.3.1 Hybrid Airspace Scenarios with a Single Encounter
In order to investigate the reactions of a level-k pilot during a conflict with
an UAS, 4 single encounter scenarios are designed. In these 4 scenarios, level-
1 and level-2 policies are used for the manned aircraft pilots and the UAS
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(a) Trajectories created by the validated model.
(b) Trajectories created by the proposed model.
(c) Separation distances for each model.
Figure 2.7: Comparison of the trajectories created by the validated model
and the game theoretical modeling approach for sample encounter number
45.
follows the guidelines of the SAA1 algorithm which may command velocity
adjustments in order for the UAS to avoid the conflict. Apart from pilot lev-
els, the effect of different approach angles, which take the values of 45◦, 90◦,
135◦ and 180◦, are also investigated. Figure 2.8 depicts the snapshots of four
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cases, where the red square corresponds to the manned aircraft and cyan tri-
angle corresponds to the UAS. The gray track line right behind the manned
aircraft and the UAS represent their traveled path from their initial positions
to where they stand in the snapshot. Circles show the initial positions and
destinations. The geometric size of the scenarios is 100km × 50km. In all
cases, the manned aircraft and the UAS are heading toward a conflict which
is detected by both the UAS, via its SAA system, and the pilot 20s prior to
a probable miss separation. A miss separation is declared when the relative
distance becomes less than 5nm. The pilot then starts an evasive maneuver
based on the level-1 and the level-2 reasoning policies, and the UAS imple-
ments its own evasive maneuver based on the SAA1 system, whose working
principles are explained in Section 2.2.5. Figure 2.9 depicts the separation
distance and trajectory deviations during these single encounter scenarios.
Comparing the performances of the level-1 and the level-2 pilots, it can be
seen that the level-1 pilot maneuvers in a way that he/she provides more
separation distance than a level-2 pilot does, except for the case with 90◦
approach angle. This, in general, is expected since the level-1 pilot assumes
that the intruder is a level-0 Decision Maker (DM) who will continue his/her
given path without changing his/her direction, and therefore the level-1 DM
takes the responsibility of the conflict resolution himself/herself. On the
other hand, the level-2 pilot considers the intruder as a level-1 DM who will
make maneuvers to avoid the conflict and therefore the conflict resolution re-
sponsibility will be shared. That is why the level-2 pilot, in comparison with
the level-1 pilot, avoids the UAS with less separation distance. It is noted,
however, that the level-1 pilot deviates from its ideal trajectory significantly
more than the level-2 pilot does. Even in the case of 90◦ approach angle,
where the minimum separation distance between the level-1 pilot and the
UAS is slightly less than the case with the level-2 pilot, the trajectory devi-
ation of the level-2 pilot is less than that of the level-1 pilot. These analyses
show that the type of the pilot reactions during a conflict scenario makes
a significant impact on the results when evaluating the performances of the
SAA algorithms. The same conclusion are derived when the UAS maneuvers
based on the SAA2 logic, however these results are omitted to save space.
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(a) level-1 pilot, approach angle 45◦ (b) level-1 pilot, approach angle 90◦
(c) level-1 pilot, approach angle
135◦
(d) level-1 pilot, approach angle
180◦
(e) level-2 pilot, approach angle 45◦ (f) level-2 pilot, approach angle 90◦
(g) level-2 pilot, approach angle
135◦
(h) level-2 pilot, approach angle
180◦
Figure 2.8: Level-1 and level-2 pilots interacting with UAS.
2.3.2 Hybrid Airspace Scenario with Multiple Encounters
The details of this scenario was explained in Section 2.2. In this section, the
scenario is simulated to investigate a) the effect of the variations in the objec-
tive function parameters, b) the effect of the distance and the time horizons
and c) the effect of responsibility assignment for conflict resolution, on safety
and performance. Since the loss of separation is the most serious issue, the
safety metric is taken as the number of separation violations between the
UAS and the manned aircraft. Performance metrics, on the other hand, in-
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(a) approach angle 45◦
(b) approach angle 90◦
(c) approach angle 135◦
(d) approach angle 180◦
Figure 2.9: Safety vs. performance of Level-k pilot interacting with UAS
clude a) averaged manned aircraft trajectory deviations, b) UAS trajectory
deviation and c) total flight time of the UAS. In all of the simulations, level-0,
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level-1 and level-2 pilot policies are randomly distributed over the manned
aircraft in such a way that 10% of the pilots fly based on level-0 policies, 60%
of the pilots act based on level-1 policies and 30% use level-2 policies. This
distribution is based on experimental results discussed in [17]. It is noted
that although the given distribution is obtained from human experimental
studies, they did not necessarily include pilots and therefore may not be fully
representative but can easily be adapted to other distributional data for this
framework.
Sensitivity analyses of the weighting parameters in the objective function
In this section, the sensitivity of the pilot model to its parameters, which are
the weight vector components of the objective function in equation (2.5), is
investigated. Specifically, the effect of the ratio of the sum of the weights of
the safety components of the objective function over the sum of the weights of
the performance components, r = w1+w2+w3
w4+w5+w6
, is investigated for various traffic
densities. The results of this analysis for various traffic densities in the HAS
is depicted in Fig. 2.10. It is seen that as r increases, the trajectory deviations
of both the manned aircraft and the UAS increases, regardless of the traffic
density. Cooperation of the manned aircraft and the UAS to resolve the
conflict reduces the number of separation violations up to a certain value of
r. However, the number of violations starts increasing with further increase
in r. What this means is that, as pilots become more sensitive about their
safety and start to overreact to probable conflicts with extreme deviations
from their trajectories, the traffic is effected in a negative way.
Fig. 2.11 presents the effect of increasing the ratio r in a single encounter
scenario where surrounding traffic does not exist. The percentage values
provided in the figure is obtained for 5000 encounters. For each r value
these 5000 encounter “episodes” are repeated 1000 times to obtain reliable
statistics. As expected, in the absence of surrounding traffic, the increase in
the ratio r decreases the number of separation violations.
Remark: In this study, it is emphasized that humans are not expected to
behave optimally in complex situations in the presence of multiple decision
makers and automation due to 1) limited observation space, 2) limited pro-
cessing power and 3) limited information about other decision makers. The
exploited modeling framework captures this suboptimal pilot response using
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(a) manned aircraft trajectory deviation
(b) UAS trajectory deviation
(c) number of separation violations
Figure 2.10: Pilot model sensitivity analysis.
several tools explained in earlier sections, including the RL algorithm which
provides convergence guarantees to a local maximum. The pilot behavior
we observe in Fig. 2.10 is an example of suboptimal behavior where, in the
presence of surrounding traffic, increased safety parameter weights, after a
certain point, can cause extreme trajectory deviations and increased separa-
tion violations. Fig. 2.11, on the other hand, presents the expected behavior
of decreasing violations with increased safety weights, when the scenario is
much simpler.
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Figure 2.11: Pilot model sensitivity analysis for the single encounter
scenario.
The effect of distance and time horizons on performance and safety
Although standard separation distance for manned aviation is 3 − 5nm [9],
UAS might require wider separation requirements compared to manned air-
craft. In the following analysis, horizontal separation requirement for the
UAS is called the distance horizon, and the effect of it is reflected into the
simulation by defining this value as the “scan radius” for the SAA algorithm:
The SAA algorithm considers an intruding aircraft as a possible threat only
if the aircraft is within the scan radius. Another variable whose effect is
investigated is defined as the time to separation violation and is called the
time horizon. In the simulation, the time horizon is used as the time interval,
within which the UAS predicts a probable conflict. Figure 2.12 and Fig. 2.13
show the effects of the time horizon and the distance horizon on the safety
and performance of the system, when SAA1 and SAA2 algorithms are used,
respectively. When SAA1 algorithm is employed, it is seen in Fig. 2.12 that
increasing the distance horizon of the UAS makes the SAA1 system detect
probable conflicts from a larger distance, which in turn increases the UAS
trajectory deviation. Increasing the time horizon makes a similar effect on
trajectory deviation. High UAS trajectory deviation results in higher flight
times for the UAS to complete its mission. In addition, higher distance and
time horizons reduce the trajectory deviations of the manned aircraft since
conflicts are resolved mostly by the UAS. When the UAS foresees the prob-
able conflicts earlier, with increased time and distance horizons, the number
of separation violations generally decreases. Increasing the distance and time
horizons after a certain point does not improve the safety (number of sepa-
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ration violations), since the UAS starts to disturb the traffic unnecessarily
due to the overreactions of the SAA system.
The first observation that strikes the eye, in the case of SAA2 system
utilization (see Fig. 2.13), is that the time horizon variations do not affect
the results as much as the case of SAA1 system utilization. The second
important difference of the SAA2 algorithm is that increasing the distance
horizon consistently improves the safety (Fig. 2.13d), unlike the case of SAA1
algorithm utilization where larger distance horizon values do not make a
major effect on safety. The reason for this difference can be explained by
comparing Figs. 2.12b and 2.13b: SAA1 causes the UAS deviate from its
trajectory significantly more than the SAA2 and thus separation violation
numbers for the SAA1 do not improve further after a point due to a significant
impact on the surrounding traffic. However, it should be noted that, in
general, the violation numbers of the SAA1 is lower than that of SAA2 (see
Figs. 2.12d-2.13d). After this quantitative analysis, it can be said that the
SAA1 system results in a safer flight (less number of violations) whereas the
SAA2 system provides a higher performance flight (lower deviations from the
trajectory).
It is important to note that when the technologies and procedures mature
enough to enable full integration of UAS into the NAS, it would not be unre-
alistic to expect that the ratio of unmanned to manned aircraft will increase
dramatically. Since HAS is a complex system where several intelligent agents
move simultaneously, it is impossible to predict the effects of increased UAS
presence. Therefore, it is important and useful to investigate the response
of the overall system to increased number of UAS. Fig. 2.14 shows the effect
of increasing the number of UAS in HAS. It is seen that, as the number of
UAS increases, trajectory deviations, flight times and separation violations
increase. It is noted that no mode/phase changes are observed in the system.
Separation responsibility analysis
Another issue to be addressed that is important in studying the integration
of UAS into NAS is the separation responsibility [4]: it is crucial to determine
which of the agents (manned aircraft or UAS) will take the responsibility of
the conflict resolution. Fig. 2.15 depicts a comparison of different resolution
responsibility cases: manned aircraft are responsible (blue), both manned
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(a) manned aircraft trajectory deviation
(b) UAS trajectory deviation
(c) UAS flight time
(d) number of separation violations
Figure 2.12: Safety vs. performance in HAS, when SAA1 is employed.
aircraft and UAS are responsible (cyan) and only the UAS is responsible
(red). In the case when only manned aircraft are responsible for conflict
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(a) manned aircraft trajectory deviation
(b) UAS trajectory deviation
(c) UAS flight time
(d) number of separation violations
Figure 2.13: Safety vs. performance in HAS, when SAA2 is employed.
resolution, UAS is forced to continue its path without executing the SAA
system and manned aircraft act as level-1 and level-2 DMs. In the case when
the UAS is responsible for the conflict resolution, the manned aircraft are
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forced to continue their path without changing their heading and the UAS
executes its SAA system. In the case when both the manned aircraft and
the UAS are responsible for the conflict resolution, they both execute their
evasive maneuvers. Figure 3.18 shows that manned aircraft deviate more
from their trajectory when both the UAS and the manned aircraft share res-
olution responsibility, compared to the case when only the manned aircraft
are responsible. This is true for both the SAA1 (the results on the left) and
the SAA2 (the results on the right) algorithms. The reason for increased
trajectory deviation for the manned aircraft in the case of shared respon-
sibility is that the pilots’ assumptions about possible UAS actions are not
always correct which forces the pilots to make additional adjustments in their
trajectory, which in turn increases manned aircraft trajectory deviations.
On the other hand, Fig. 3.20 shows that the UAS deviates from its trajec-
tory more when it is responsible for the resolution, compared to the case when
the responsibility is shared, when SAA1 is utilized. For the case of SAA2
utilization, deviations are less and do not change much based on the respon-
sibility assignments. Figure 3.19 shows, as expected, that for both SAA1
and SAA2, the UAS flight times are the shortest when only the manned
aircraft become responsible for the resolution. Perhaps the most important
result is given in Fig. 3.21, where it is shown that for both SAA1 and SAA2
utilizations, the safest case is when the resolution responsibility is given to
the UAS.
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(a) manned aircraft trajectory deviation
(b) UAS trajectory deviation
(c) UAS flight time
(d) number of separation violations
Figure 2.14: Safety vs. performance in HAS, when SAA1 is employed, in a
multi-UAS scenario.
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(a) manned aircraft trajectory deviation
(b) UAS trajectory deviation
(c) UAS flight time
(d) number of separation violations
Figure 2.15: SAA1, SAA2 and safety vs. performance in HAS.
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CHAPTER 3
3D FRAMEWORK
3.1 UAS Integration Scenario
In order to evaluate the outcomes of integrating Unmanned Aircraft Sys-
tems (UAS) in to the National Air Space (NAS), a Hybrid Air Space (HAS)
scenario, where manned and unmanned aircraft co-exist is designed and
explained in this section. The scenario consists of 188 manned aircraft
and 3 UAS. The size of the airspace is 600km × 300km × 45000ft. The
initial positions, velocities, headings and altitudes of the aircraft are ob-
tained from Flightradar24 website which provides live air traffic data (http:
//www.flightradar24.com). The data is collected from air traffic volume on
Colorado state, USA airspace on 11 March, 2015. The manned aircraft in the
scenario execute maneuvers based on the pilot model obtained using a com-
bination of reinforcement learning and level-k reasoning, the details of which
is explained in the following Section 3.2. Multiple UAS can be randomly
located in the airspace and move based on their pre-programmed flight plan
from one waypoint to another. Figure 3.1 shows a snapshot of the scenario
with multiple manned aircraft and three UAS moving through their multiple
waipoints. All aircraft whether manned or unmanned are flying at different
altitudes and this snapshot depicts a 2D projection of their configuration
, on the horizontal plane. The red squares correspond to manned aircraft
and the cyan squares correspond to UAS, which are flying at different alti-
tudes. All aircraft, manned or unmanned have continuous dynamics, which
are provided in the following sections. Yellow circles show the predetermined
waypoints that the UAS with the highest altitude is required to pass. The
waypoints of other two UAS are not shown in this snapshot. The dashed
blue lines passing through the waypoints show the predetermined path of
the UAS. It is noted that the UAS do not follow this path exactly since they
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need to deviate from their original trajectory to avoid possible conflicts using
an on-board Sense and Avoid (SAA) algorithm, which is obtained from [40]
and [39].
Figure 3.1: 2D snapshot of the airspace scenario in the simulation platform.
In the scenario, it is assumed that each aircraft is able to receive the
surrounding traffic information using Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) technology. ADS-B technology can provide an own-ship
aircraft the identification, position and velocity information of surrounding
aircraft that are also equipped with ADS-B.
3.1.1 UAS Conflict Detection And Avoidance Logic
UAS fly according to their pre-programmed flight plans marked by the yellow
shown in the Fig. 3.1. UAS are assumed to have the dynamics of RQ-4
Global Hawk with operation speeds of 340knots, respectively [38]. UAS are
also equipped with SAA systems which enable them to detect trajectory
conflicts and to initiate evasive maneuvers, if necessary. If no conflict is
detected, the UAS continues to follow its mission plan. Either receiving a
conflict resolution command from the SAA system or flying based on their
pre-defined flight plan, UAS always receives a velocity command during the
flight. The velocity vector variation dynamics of the UAS is modeled by a
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first order dynamics with a time constant of 1s [39] which is represented as:
~˙v = −(~v − ~vd), (3.1)
where ~v and ~vd are the current and the desired/commanded velocity vectors,
respectively. The two SAA logic that are utilized in this study are developed
by Fasano et al. [40], which is referred as SAA1, and Mujumdar et al. [39],
which is referred as SAA2. Both of the SAA logics are consist of two phases;
a conflict detection phase and a conflict resolution phase. The conflict detec-
tion phase is the same for both SAA1 and SAA2. A conflict is detected if the
minimum distance between the UAS and the intruder aircraft is calculated
to be less than a minimum required distance, R, during a predefined time
interval. The minimum distance is calculated by projecting the trajectories
of the UAS and the intruder aircraft in time. Once the conflict is detected,
SAA1 and SAA2 suggest their own velocity adjustment commands in order
to resolve the conflict. The velocity adjustment command of the SAA1 and
SAA2 logics, ~vd1A and
~vd2A are given in the equations below
~vd1A =
[
vAB cos(η − ζ)
sin(ζ)
[sin(η)
~vAB
vAB
− sin(η − ζ) ~r‖~r‖ ]
]
+ ~vB (3.2)
~vd2A =
−~vA(~r0.~vAB‖~vAB‖ )− (R− ‖~rm‖) ~rm‖~rm‖
‖ − ~vA(~r0.~vAB‖~vAB‖ )− (R− ‖~rm‖) ~rm‖~rm‖‖
(3.3)
where, ~vA and ~vB refer to the velocity vectors of the UAS and the intruder. ~r
and ~vAB denote the relative position and velocity between the UAS and the
intruder, respectively. ζ is the angle between ~r and ~vAB and η is calculated
as η = sin−1 R‖~r‖ . ~r0 refers to the initial relative position vector between the
UAS and the intruder. In the case of multiple conflict detection, the UAS will
start an evasive maneuver to resolve the conflict that is predicted to happen
earliest. The velocity adjustment suggested by the SAA1 logic guarantees
minimum deviation from the trajectory, while in the case of the SAA2 logic,
UAS moves to resolve the conflict until it retains the minimum safe distance
with the intruder.
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3.1.2 Manned Aircraft
All manned aircraft are assumed to be in their en-route phase of travel with
constant speed, v, in the range of [150 − 550]knots. Pilots may decide to
change the heading angle for ±45◦, or change the pitch angle for ±10◦, or
may decide to keep both the heading and pitch angles unchanged. Once
the pilot gives a heading or pitch command, the aircraft moves to the desired
heading and pitch, ψd and θd, in the constant speed mode where, the heading
and pitch change is modeled by a first order dynamics with the standard rate
turn: a turn in which an aircraft changes its heading at a rate of 3◦ per second
(360◦ in 2 minutes) [37]. This is modeled as a first order dynamics with a
time constant of 10s (45× (1−1/e)/3 ≈ 10). Therefore, the aircraft heading
and pitch angle dynamics can be given as
ψ˙ = − 1
10
× (ψ − ψd) (3.4)
θ˙ = − 1
10
× (θ − θd) (3.5)
and the velocity, ~v = (vx, vy, vz), is then obtained as:
vx = ‖~v‖ sinψ cos θ. (3.6)
vy = ‖~v‖ cosψ cos θ. (3.7)
vz = ‖~v‖ sin θ. (3.8)
3.2 Pilot Decision Model
The proposed pilot decision making process model in this study is formed by
combining of two methodology: the dynamic level-k reasoning and the neural
fitted Q iteration (NFQ), which is an approximate reinforcement. A level-k-
type model is trained by assigning level-k-1-type behavior to all of the agents
(manned aircraft) except the one that is being trained. The trainee learns
to react as best as he/she can in this environment using NFQ. Thus, the
resulting behavior becomes a level-k type. This process starts with training
a level-1 type behavior and continues until the highest desired level is reached.
Once all of the desired levels are obtained, the training stage ends and, in
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the simulation stage, the obtained level-k reaction models are then are used
in a airspace scenario explained in Section 3.2 where both manned aircraft
and UAS co-exist. In the simulation certain proportions of level-0, level-1
and level-2 behavior type are assigned to the manned aircraft. It is noted
that each of level-1 and level-2 agents can change their level-k behavior type
based on Dynamic level-k reasoning method after observing their intruder’s
behavior.
3.2.1 Dynamic Level-k Reasoning
Level-k reasoning is a game theoretical model where the main idea is that
humans have various levels of reasoning in their decision-making process [25].
It has been observed that reasoning levels are related to the cognitive abili-
ties of humans [23]. The level hierarchy is iteratively defined such that the
level-k rule is a best response to the level-(k-1) rule. A level-1 decision maker
(DM), for example, assumes that the other agents in the scenario are level-0
and takes actions accordingly to provide the best response. A level-2 DM
takes actions to give the best response to other DMs that have level-1 rea-
soning and so on. From a modeling standpoint, the level-0 rule represents an
initial point from which more sophisticated rules can be obtained iteratively.
A Level-0 here represents a “nonstrategic” DM who does not take into ac-
count other DMs, possible moves when choosing his/her own actions. This
behavior can also be considered as “reflexive” because it only reacts to the
immediate observations. In this study, a level-0 pilot flies an aircraft with
constant heading and pitch angles starting from its initial position toward
its destination.
In its conventional form, level-k reasoning help model the interactions be-
tween the DMs where a level-k DM assumes that the interacted DM has
level-(k-1) reasoning. Although this approach proved to be successful in pre-
dicting short term or one-shot interactions, it misses the point that agents,
during their interactions, may update their assumptions about the other
agents and therefore update their own behavior. To remedy this problem,
we introduce a closed loop algorithm which allows the agents to dynamically
update their reasoning levels if a conflict is detected. This algorithm is ex-
plained in Fig. 3.2, where a pseudo-code is provided. It is noted that in the
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simulations, a simpler version of the algorithm provided in Fig. 3.2 is used,
where one of the agents are randomly selected to switch their level, instead
of giving each agent a %50 chance for level switching.
Figure 3.2: Dynamic level-k reasoning pseudo-code.
3.2.2 Neural Fitted Q Iteration
Reinforcement learning is a mathematical learning method based on reward
and punishment [43]. The agent interacts with an environment through its
observations, actions and a scalar reward signal received from the environ-
ment. The agent’s aim is to select actions that maximizes the cumulative
future reward. Given a state, when an action increases (decreases) the value
of an objective function (reward), which defines the goals of the agent, the
probability of taking that action increases (decreases). Reinforcement learn-
ing algorithms involve estimating the state-action value function, or “the Q
value”, which is a measure of how valuable, in terms of maximizing the total
accumulated rewards, taking an action is, given the agent’s state. This es-
timation is generally conducted in an iterative fashion by updating these Q
values after each training step. In classical Q-learning reinforcement learn-
ing algorithm, for discrete state and action spaces, the update rule is given
by [29] and [31]:
Q(s, a)→ (1− α)Q(s, a) + α(r(s, a, s′) + γmax
a
Q(s′, a)) (3.9)
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where, s, a, and s′ refer to the state, action, and the successor state, re-
spectively. α is a learning rate γ is a discounting factor. In the case of
continuous state space and discrete action space, Neural Fitted Q Iteration
(NFQ) method [29] and [31] approximates the Q value function using a neu-
ral network of type multi-layer perceptron. For a given state-action pair the
neural network takes the state and action as its input and provides an ap-
proximate value of the corresponding Q value for the state-action pair. The
method’s aim is to minimize the following error function (see [29]):
(Q(s, a)− (r(s, a, s′) + γmax
a
Q(s′, a)))2. (3.10)
where, r(.) is the reward signal that agent receives from the environment
after the transition from state, s to state, s′ by taking action a. This
error function measures the deviations between state-action Q values ap-
proximated by the multi-layer perceptron (Q(s, a)) and the target value
(r(s, a, s′) + γmax
a
Q(s′, a))). In the NFQ method, Q value functions are
updated in a batches which means that the entire set of input patterns
((si, ai), i = 0, 1, 2, 3...) and target patterns (r(si, ai, s
′
i)+γmax
a
Q(s′i, ai)), i =
0, 1, 2, 3...) are collected and the update is performed at the end of a full
episode, where an episode is defined as .... Concisely, the NFQ consists of
two major steps: the generation of a training set and training a multi-layer
perceptron using this set to obtain a Q-value function approximating the
optimal state-action Q-values, at the end of each episode. The training is
stopped whenever the received average reward per episode converges.
The goal of the reinforcement learning algorithm is to learn the optimal
Q values by maximizing the agent’s return, which is calculated via a re-
ward/objective function. A reward function can be considered as a happiness
function, goal function or utility function which represents, mathematically,
the preferences of the pilot. In this paper, the pilot reward function is defined
as
reward = w1 ∗ (−C) + w2 ∗ (−S) + w3 ∗ (−A) + w4 ∗ (−P ) (3.11)
In (11) “C” is the number of aircraft within the collision region. Based on
the definition provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the
radius of collision is taken as 500ft in the horizontal direction and 100ft
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in the vertical direction [36]. “S” is the number of air vehicles within the
separation region. The radius of the separation region is 5nm in the horizon-
tal direction [9] and 1000ft in the vertical direction based on the “Reduced
vertical separation minima” [36]. “A” represents whether the aircraft is get-
ting closer to the intruder or going away from the intruder in terms of their
approach angle and takes the values of 1, for getting closer, or 0, for going
away. “P” represents whether the aircraft gets closer to or goes away from
its trajectory vector in terms of angle and takes the values of 0, for getting
closer, or 1, for going away.
Although ADS-B provides the positions and the velocities of other aircraft,
with his/her limited cognitive capabilities a pilot can not possibly process all
this information during his/her decision making process. In this study, in or-
der to model pilot limitations, including the limitations at visual acuity and
perception depth, as well as the limited viewing range of an aircraft, it is as-
sumed that the pilots can observe (or process) the information from a limited
portion of the nearby airspace. This limited portion is called the “observa-
tion space”. Since the the aircraft are moving in a 3D region, the observation
space is a 3D portion of the nearby airspace. This observation space is con-
sidered as a portion of a sphere centered at the location of the pilot. In order
to illustrate the observation space, it is divided into horizontal and vertical
parts and is schematically depicted in Fig. 3.3. Since viewing range of a pilot
may be different in horizontal and vertical directions, the observation space
in these two directions are shown as different angular portions of a circle.
Since the standard separation for manned aviation is 3− 5nm [9], the radius
of the observation space is taken as a variable larger than the 5nm. Whenever
an intruder aircraft moves toward the observation space (see Fig. 3.3, where
Agent B is the intruder), the approach geometry is defined by two angles:
φH , in the horizontal plane, and φV , in the vertical plane. The aircraft’s
angular orientation with respect to his/her ideal trajectory is also defined
by two angles: βH , in the horizontal plane, and βV , in the vertical plane.
Fig. 3.3 depicts a typical example, where the aircraft B is moving toward the
observation space with φH = −40◦, φV = −40◦, βH = −110◦ and βV − 90◦.
Aircraft relative orientations are also coded as different “encounter types”.
Figure 3.4 depicts 8 types of encounter geometries projected in the horizon-
tal plane (left column) and four types of encounter projected in the vertical
plane (right column). These geometries are indicated as C#i, i = 1, 2, ..., 8
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Figure 3.3: Pilot observation space.
in the figure. Finally, the observation space includes the pilot’s memory of
what their actions were at the previous time step. Given an observation, the
pilots can choose between five actions: turn 45◦ left, go straight, turn 45◦
right, pitch 10◦ up, or pitch 10◦ down. It is noted that these pilot commands
are filtered through the aircraft dynamics provided in Section 3.1.2.
The information of the observations and actions of the pilots fed to the
neural network which is in charge of approximating the Q values. The input
vector fed into the neural network is [sign(βH), sign(βV ), intruderstatus,
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Figure 3.4: Encounter categories.
sign(φH), sign(φV ), encountertype, previousaction, action]
T , where sign(.)
takes the values of +1, −1 or 0 if its argument is a positive value, negative
value or zero, respectively. The intruderstatus is taken as 1 whenever an
intruder is detected by the pilot, and 0, otherwise. The encountertype (see
Fig. 3.4) is fed to the neural network in the form of a vector with 2 elements
indicating the encounter type in horizontal plane and vertical plane. The
1st element take the values of −1, −0.5, 0.5 and +1 for encounter types of
C#1, C#2, C#3 and C#4 in horizontal plane, and 0, otherwise. Similarly,
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the 2nd element take the values of −1, −0.5, 0.5 and +1 for encounter types
of C#5, C#6, C#7 and C#8 in vertical plane, and 0, otherwise. The
previousaction and action are fed to the neural network in the form of a
vector with 4 elements: actions “turn 45◦ left”, “go straight”, “turn 45◦
right”, “pitch 10◦ up”, or “pitch 10◦ down” are coded as [0, 0, 0, 1], [0, 0, 1, 0],
[0, 1, 0, 0], [1, 0, 0, 0] and [−1,−1,−1,−1], respectively.
3.3 Simulation Results and Discussion
In this section, a quantitative analysis of multiple UAS integration in a
crowded airspace is presented. Before presenting these results, single en-
counter scenarios, where two manned aircraft with different reasoning levels
which are in a collision path, are investigated.
3.3.1 Single Encounter Scenarios Between Manned Aircraft
Figure 3.5 presents the separation violation rates of manned aircraft in 5000
random single encounters where pilots are modeled as level-1 and level-2 de-
cision makers. Separation violation occurs when both the horizontal and the
vertical distances between the two aircraft are less than the horizontal sepa-
ration requirement, 5nm [9] and the reduced vertical separation requirement,
1000ft [9], respectively. In the figure, separation violations are shown for 3
different “distance horizon” values, which is the radius of the observation
space depicted in Fig. 3.3. Any distance less than the distance horizon is
defined as miss separation. Pilots oversee a 20s time window prior to a prob-
able miss separation distance with a 5second decision frequency for choosing
their actions. Distance horizon takes three values: 5nm (equal to horizontal
separation requirement), 7.5nm and 10nm. Pilots are either level-0, level-1
or level-2 agents. There are 4 possible types of scenarios: 1) level-1 pilot
vs. level-0 pilot, 2) level-2 pilot vs. level-1 pilot, 3) level-1 pilot vs. level-1
pilot, and 4) level-2 pilot vs. level-2 pilot. According to the Fig. 3.5, in the
1st type and 2nd type scenarios (level-k vs level-(k-1)), by increasing the dis-
tance horizon from 5nm to 10nm the separation violation rate decreases from
%96.6 to %11.9. It is noted that %9.8 of the 10nm distance horizon separa-
tion violations is occur during the scenarios where the encounters are difficult
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Figure 3.5: Separation violation rates. “dst hor” refers to the distance
horizon of the pilots. On the columns that shows the separation violation
rates for a 10nm distance horizon, the cyan color shows the percentage of
violations that occur when the encounters are “difficult to resolve”,
meaning that the initial conditions of the encounters do not permit any
type of pilot action to avoid a separation violation.
to be resolved. This is because for these type of encounters, no matter how
pilots in the collision path maneuver to resolve the conflict the separation
violation occur. In the 3rd type and fourth type of scenarios (level-k vs level-
k) the separation violation rate deceases by increasing the pilots’ distance
horizon, however, separation violation rate is still high (%41.2) even for the
10nm case. The reason for this high separation violation rate is that when a
level-k agent encounters another agent with the same level, his/her assump-
tion about the other becomes invalid. This problem and its implications were
discussed in Section 3.2.1, where a remedy were proposed (see Fig 3.2), which
resulted in a “dynamic” level-k reasoning method. According to Fig. 3.5, the
separation violation rate, for regular encounters (red), decreases from %11.1
to %2.6, when dynamic level-k reasoning is chosen as the interactive decision
making model, for the case of 10nm distance horizon.
Two 3D single encounter scenarios are designed to schematically show the
performance of pilots: 1) 1st scenario consists of two manned aircraft flying
with constant speeds in different altitude levels where, their initial horizontal
distance and vertical distances are 21.3nm and 1000ft, respectively, 2) 2nd
scenario consists of two manned aircraft where one of the manned aircraft
is flying in a horizontal plane with constant speed and the other manned
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Figure 3.6: Sample encounter 1: level-1 pilot vs. level-0 pilot.
aircraft is leveling up with a constant vertical rate of 1968ft/min with initial
horizontal distance and vertical distances of 21nm and 1000ft, respectively.
In these two scenarios, two manned aircraft are flying in an encounter path
with each other and pilots can oversee conflicts in a 20s time window prior to
miss separation. All pilot’s distance horizon is considered to be 10nm. Both
of the aircraft can change the heading angle for ±45◦, or change the pitch
angle for ±10◦, or may keep both the heading and pitch angles unchanged. In
both of the scenarios 4 cases for pilots’ level-k type behavior are considered:
1) a level-1 pilot vs. a level-0 pilot, 2) a level-2 pilot vs. a level-1 pilot, 3) a
level-1 pilot vs. a level-1 pilot, and 4) a dynamic level-1 pilot vs. a level-1
pilot.
Figure 3.6, Fig. 3.7, Fig. 3.8 and Fig. 3.9 depict the 2D snapshots the
four cases for the 1st scenario. The black squares, red squares and green
squares correspond to manned aircraft with level-0 type behavior, level-1
type behavior and level-2 type behavior. The circles stand for the intila
location and destination of the aircraft. The gray track line right behind
the manned aircraft represent their traveled path from their initial positions
to where they stand in the snapshot. Figure 3.10 and Fig. 3.11 depict the
horizontal and vertical distances between the two aircraft for all the 4 cases
in the 1st scenario. During the conflict resolution the minimum horizontal
distance and vertical distance of the two aircraft are 2.7nm and 1825ft in the
1st case scenario, respectively and 4.5nm and 1471ft in 2nd case scenario.
Therefore, pilots were able to resolve the conflict.
Taking a look at the 3rd case scenario where two pilots are level-1 type
agents and assume that their intruders are level-1 type agents, pilots turn
toward each other instead of resolving the encounter. During the encounter
the minimum horizontal distance and minimum vertical distances are 0.5nm
49
Figure 3.7: Sample encounter 1: level-2 pilot vs. level-1 pilot.
Figure 3.8: Sample encounter 1: level-1 pilot vs. level-1 pilot.
and 991ft and separation violation occurs. In the 4th case scenario, one of
the pilots (the pilot starting its notion from left to right side of the snap-
shot) is able to observe its intruder’s maneuver. This pilot first execute a
maneuver such that its intruder is a level-1 type agent and turns toward its
intruder. Then the pilot observes its intruder’s maneuver within 10s, project
their trajectories and detects a critical conflict and changes its level-1 type
rule to the level-2 type rule. In this case during the encounter the mini-
mum horizontal distance and the minimum vertical distances are 3.5nm and
1051ft, therefore, separation violation does not occur. It is noted that if
pilots decided to go straight and do not participate in the conflict resolution
Level Changed
Conflict Detected
Trajectory Projections 
Figure 3.9: Sample encounter 1: dynamic level-1 pilot vs. level-1 pilot.
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Figure 3.10: Sample encounter 1: horizontal distance.
Figure 3.11: Sample encounter 1: vertical distance.
the minimum horizontal distance and the minimum vertical distances are
0.54nm and 1000ft.
Figure 3.12, Fig. 3.13, Fig. 3.14 and Fig. 3.15 depict the 2D snapshots for
the four cases of the 2nd scenario. Figure 3.16 and Fig. 3.17 represent the
horizontal and vertical distances of the two manned aircraft. During conflict
resolution in the 1st case scenario the minimum horizontal distance and the
minimum vertical distance of the two aircraft are 2.8nm and 1847ft and in
the 2nd case scenario, the minimum horizontal distance and the minimum
vertical distance of the two aircraft are 3nm and 2367ft. Similar to the 1st
scenario, pilots resolve the conflict. During conflict resolution in the 3rd case
scenario the minimum horizontal distance and the minimum vertical distance
of the two aircraft are 0.56nm and 966ft and in the 4th case scenario, the
minimum horizontal distance and the minimum vertical distance of the two
aircraft are 3.3nm and 1001ft. Similar to the 1st scenario, utilizing the
dynamic level-k rule, pilots are able to resolve the conflict.
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Figure 3.12: Sample encounter 2: level-1 pilot vs. level-0 pilot.
Figure 3.13: Sample encounter 2: level-2 pilot vs. level-1 pilot.
3.3.2 Statistical Results For UAS Integration
In this section, the scenario explained in Section 3.1 is simulated to investi-
gate the effect of responsibility assignment for conflict resolution, on safety
and performance for various number of UAS integrated in to the crowded
airspace. It is noted that the separation responsibility is an important issue
in addressing the integration of UAS into NAS [4]: it is crucial to determine
which of the agents (manned aircraft or UAS) will take the responsibility
of the conflict resolution. Since the loss of separation is the most serious
issue, the safety metric is taken as the total number of separation violations
Figure 3.14: Sample encounter 2: level-1 pilot vs. level-1 pilot.
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Figure 3.15: Sample encounter 2: dynamic level-1 pilot vs. level-1 pilot.
Figure 3.16: Sample encounter 2: horizontal distance.
between all aircraft whether manned or unmanned. Performance metric, on
the other hand, is taken as the averaged manned and unmanned aircraft
trajectory deviations. In all of the simulations, level-0, level-1 and level-2
pilot policies are randomly distributed over the manned aircraft in such a
way that 10% of the pilots fly based on level-0 policies, 60% of the pilots
act based on level-1 policies and 30% use level-2 policies. This distribution
is obtained from human experimental studies discussed in [17] and may not
necessarily reflect the true distribution for pilots. It is noted, however, that
Figure 3.17: Sample encounter 2: vertical distance.
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level distribution can easily be adapted to other distributional data in this
framework. Level-1 type and level-2 type pilots utilize the dynamic level-k
reasoning method.
Figure 3.18, Fig. 3.20, Fig. 3.19, and Fig. 3.21 depict a comparison of differ-
ent resolution responsibility cases for the two SAA1 ans SAA2 logic: manned
aircraft are responsible (dark blue), both manned aircraft and UAS are re-
sponsible (blue) and only the UAS is responsible (cyan). In the case when
only manned aircraft are responsible for conflict resolution, UAS is forced
to continue its path without executing the SAA system and manned aircraft
act as dynamic level-1 and level-2 DMs. In the case when the UAS is respon-
sible for the conflict resolution, the manned aircraft are forced to continue
their path without changing their heading and the UAS executes its SAA
system. In the case when both the manned aircraft and the UAS are respon-
sible for the conflict resolution, they both execute their evasive maneuvers.
Figure 3.18 shows that manned aircraft deviate more from their trajectory
when only the manned aircraft share resolution responsibility, compared to
the case when both of the UAS and the manned aircraft are responsible.
This is true for both the SAA1 (the results on the left) and the SAA2 (the
results on the right) algorithms. On the other hand, Fig. 3.20 shows that the
UAS deviates from its trajectory more when it is responsible for the resolu-
tion, compared to the case when the responsibility is shared, when SAA1 is
utilized. For the case of SAA2 utilization, the case is the same. Figure 3.19
shows, as expected, that for both SAA1 and SAA2, the UAS flight times
are the shortest when only the manned aircraft become responsible for the
resolution. According to the Fig. 3.21 for both SAA1 and SAA2 utilizations,
the safest case is when the resolution responsibility is shared between the
UAS and the manned aircraft..
Figure 3.18: Average trajectory deviation of manned aircraft.
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Figure 3.19: Average trajectory deviation of UAS.
Figure 3.20: UAS flight time.
Figure 3.21: Separation violation between manned aircraft and UAS.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, a 2D and a 3D game theoretical modeling framework are pro-
posed for use in the integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into
the National Airspace System (NAS), as a means for concept evaluations. In
both of these frameworks, the inclusion of the human decision making pro-
cess in modeling the human pilot behavior is the main contribution, which
fills an important gap in the literature of hybrid airspace systems (HAS)
modeling, where in general, the pilot reactions are assumed to be known a
priori. The method used in both of the approaches provides probabilistic
outcomes of complex scenarios where both manned and unmanned aircraft
co-exist. Thus, by being able to provide quantitative analyses, the proposed
frameworks prove themselves to be useful in investigating the effect of various
system variables, such as separation distances and the utilization of different
Sense And Avoid (SAA) algorithms, on the safety and performance metrics
of the airspace system. These frameworks can also be used to quantitatively
analyze the effect of different responsibility assignments for conflict resolu-
tion and SAA design parameters such as UAS distance horizon and UAS time
horizon, on safety and performance of the national airspace. These analyses
can be helpful to evaluate technologies and concepts related to UAS integra-
tion into the NAS. It is noted that, the proposed frameworks are flexible so
that any rules and procedures that the pilots are required to follow, for ex-
ample Traffic Control Alert Systems (TCAS) advisories, can be incorporated
into the model. Different manned aircraft and UAS dynamic models can be
incorporated to the framework as well.
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